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An unfortunate fact of life is that things fre-
quently do not go as planned. Whatever the rea-
son—poor planning, a change of mind, altered cir-
cumstances, or mere bad luck—people must then 
decide whether to try something different or con-
tinue with their original plans. If individual prefer-
ences or circumstances have changed, future utility 
would often be increased by changing behaviors. 
For example, imagine that you decide you want to 
learn how to play the cello. After buying a $1,000 
cello and spending an additional $200 for 3 months 
of lessons, you lose interest in it and want to stop 
taking lessons. What do you do?
Decision makers display the sunk cost (or esca-
lation) effect if they continue to pour resources into 
a plan or project even though future utility would be 
increased by terminating the plan or switching to an 
alternative behavior (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Brock-
ner, 1992; Thaler, 1980). In the above example, a fre-
quent response to the dilemma is to continue taking 
more expensive lessons simply because a great deal 
of money and time have already been spent and 
would otherwise be wasted. Such a response is non-
normative because the decision maker is influenced 
by the initial investment (i.e., the cost of the cello 
and the lessons), even though it is irretrievably lost 
and therefore irrelevant in weighing the future con-
sequences of the current decision.
This kind of reasoning has been observed in a 
variety of situations. Sunk costs influence personal 
decisions (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Brockner & Ru-
bin, 1985; Garland & Newport, 1991), financial de-
cisions in business (Garland, 1990; Staw, 1976), 
evaluations of employees’ performance (Bazerman, 
Beekun, & Schoorman, 1982), and competitive be-
havior (Teger, 1980). These diverse situations are 
all cases in which the mere fact of an initial invest-
ment—usually money or time—can influence a de-
cision maker’s subsequent behavior, although future 
resources could be used more effectively in another 
manner.
Factors Affecting the Sunk Cost Effect
An obvious prediction that is consistent with the 
sunk cost effect is that the greater the initial invest-
ment, the stronger the effect should be; for example, 
one should be more likely to continue taking cello 
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lessons if the cello cost $1,000 than if it cost $100 
or nothing. Experimental evidence has supported 
this prediction (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Garland, 
1990), although Garland and Newport (1991) have 
found that the absolute amount of the initial invest-
ment is less important than the relative cost com-
pared with an individual’s total available resources. 
The importance of relative costs is consistent with 
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), ac-
cording to which future losses (here the displea-
sure produced by continuing the lessons) result in a 
smaller decrease in subjective value as the amount 
already lost (i.e., the cost of the cello and the initial 
lessons) increases (see also Thaler, 1980).
Situational factors may also come into play. For 
example, Staw (1976) and Whyte (1993) reported 
that sunk cost behavior was more frequent when 
the decision maker felt personally responsible for 
any negative consequences engendered by the orig-
inal plan of action. In contrast, Simonson and Nye 
(1992) found that accountability for one’s decision 
decreased susceptibility to the sunk cost effect. Si-
monson and Nye’s results were likely influenced by 
their use of business students, many of whom had 
been formally trained to avoid the sunk cost effect 
(cf. Larrick, Morgan, & Nisbett, 1990). Finally, 
Arkes and Blumer (1985) found no consistent re-
lationship between sunk cost behavior and whether 
oneself or a third party made the decision. These 
studies indicate that the effect of personal involve-
ment on behavior in such situations is still unclear.
Are There Rational Reasons for Sunk Cost?
The decision to continue with a plan because 
of sunk costs is usually viewed as a cognitive bias 
(Baron, 1990). Regardless of the arguments on 
which the decision is based, if all other factors are 
equal, then greater utility is achieved by ignor-
ing past costs and attending solely to future conse-
quences. However, there are circumstances in which 
sunk cost behavior may in fact be rational in the 
sense of increasing overall utility.
People typically justify sunk cost behavior be-
cause they do not wish to appear wasteful (Arkes & 
Blumer, 1985; Frisch, 1993; Teger, 1980). Because 
it is adaptive not to waste resources, a rule against 
waste is generally a good rule to have. However, it 
may also be maladaptive, as when the rule is over-
generalized to situations in which the resources have 
already been sunk and remaining resources might 
be more useful elsewhere (Baron, 1990). Such rea-
soning attends to irrelevant factors and is therefore 
counterproductive from a utilitarian perspective.
However, a number of potentially rational rea-
sons might underlie the apparently irrational inclina-
tion not to waste irretrievably lost resources. Three 
such reasons are the opportunity to learn a lesson, 
punishment for making a bad decision, and the de-
sire to appear to be a consistent decision maker. Be-
low we address each of these reasons for continuing 
a failed plan.
One reason why individuals might continue with 
a failed plan (like playing an instrument despite not 
enjoying it) is to teach themselves that next time 
they should think carefully before making an expen-
sive purchase. This argument is potentially rational 
because it may lead to improved future decisions. 
However, it implies that the decision maker has two 
“selves,” one a teacher and the other a learner. A 
number of decision theorists have portrayed the de-
cision maker as having multiple selves (e.g., Elster, 
1986; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). For example, Tha-
ler and Shefrin’s (1981) theory of self-control de-
scribes the decision maker as consisting of both a 
“myopic doer,” who executes decisions but is influ-
enced only by short-term consequences, and a “far-
sighted planner,” who is concerned with lifetime 
utility. Self-control is achieved when the planner 
persuades the doer to act in accordance with long-
term goals.
The learn-a-lesson argument for sunk cost behav-
ior is similar, but it implies a teacher and a learner, 
rather than a planner and a doer. Such an argument 
is even more plausible if the teacher and learner ac-
tually are two people, especially in situations where 
lesson teaching is clearly appropriate, such as a par-
ent teaching a child. Children’s decision making 
is subject to a number of cognitive biases (Baron, 
Granato, Spranca, & Teubal, 1993; Klayman, 1985), 
which are unlikely to be corrected by mere experi-
ence (Baron, 1990). Hence, parents can play an im-
portant and potentially effective role in teaching 
their children how to be better decision makers.
A second reason for continuing a failed plan is 
to endure the failed outcome as penance for mak-
ing a bad decision. Punishment decreases the likeli-
hood that the decision maker will make the same re-
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sponse in the future; therefore, it would also serve 
the function of teaching the decision maker a les-
son. Like the learn-a-lesson argument, punishment 
implies a decision maker with learner and teacher–
punisher components. Unlike the learn-a-lesson rea-
soning, however, punishment can deliver retribution 
with no explicit explanation for why the punishment 
is necessary (other than that the decision maker de-
serves it). Thus, punishment is a rational defense 
for attending to sunk costs if it provides deterrence 
against future bad decision making but not if it pro-
vides mere vengeance. Consequently, continuing in 
order to learn a lesson should be more effective at 
changing the learner’s behavior than continuing as 
penance.
A final line of reasoning for continuing the plan 
is to present the appearance of a good, consistent 
decision maker. Changing a course of action is of-
ten interpreted as meaning that the original decision 
was poorly made—an admission of error—and con-
sistency may bring admiration from others (Staw, 
1981; Staw & Ross, 1987). Thus, this argument can 
be viewed as rational because of the high subjective 
utility associated with a favorable self-presentation 
(cf. Goffman, 1959). Like the learn-a-lesson and 
punishment arguments, the consistency argument 
also implies a multiple-self decision maker (i.e., an 
actor and an evaluator).
In addition to its influence on the opinion of oth-
ers, continuing a plan already underway also al-
lows one to view oneself as a good decision maker; 
that is, escalation is often motivated by self-justifi-
cation (Bobocel & Meyer, 1994; Brockner, 1992). 
This would be the case if one adhered to a rule al-
ways to finish what one has started. However, such 
a personal rule (cf. Ainslie, 1986) would not be af-
fected by situational variables shown to influence 
sunk cost behavior, such as the amount of the initial 
investment.
These potentially rational reasons for continu-
ing an original plan will not apply to all sunk cost 
situations. For example, Arkes and Blumer (1985, 
Experiment 6) showed that most subjects would 
choose to eat the more expensive of two previously 
purchased, identical TV dinners. In this situation, 
more cannot be learned by eating the more expen-
sive dinner, nor does one appear more consistent by 
doing so. Such rationales are feasible only in situ-
ations where one has invested an initial cost and is 
then faced with the options of continuing the orig-
inal plan or switching to a more cost-effective al-
ternative. However, one is infrequently forced to 
choose between two alternatives that are identical 
except for their cost; on the other hand, there are 
frequently times when changing circumstances re-
quire a choice between one’s original plan and try-
ing something different.
Experimental Overview
We conducted three experiments to explore po-
tentially rational justifications for sunk cost be-
havior in such “continue-or-switch” situations. In 
each experiment, participants read a series of sce-
narios and rated five possible responses, including 
the normative response (switch to a more cost-ef-
fective alternative), the traditional sunk cost argu-
ment (the waste response), and the learn-a-lesson, 
punishment, and consistency arguments described 
above. These last four responses all involved a con-
tinuation of the original plan. We addressed the ef-
fect of a number of factors on the attractiveness of 
each of these responses. In Experiment 1, we ma-
nipulated the care with which the original decision 
had been made, the amount of the initial invest-
ment, and whether a parent had an opportunity to 
teach a lesson to a child. In Experiments 2 and 3, 
we investigated the role of personal responsibility 
and the effect on sunk cost behavior of the lesson 
learner’s age and relationship to the teacher. If sunk 
cost (i.e., continuation) behavior occurs for some or 
all of these reasons, it should be more common in 
some situations than others.
Experiment 1
Study participants rated the attractiveness of each 
response for a number of scenarios. These scenarios 
varied as a function of three variables: Whether (a) 
the decision maker was portrayed as an adult acting 
alone or as a parent deciding with a child; (b) the de-
cision was made carefully or carelessly; and (c) the 
initial investment was relatively large or small. We 
make specific predictions (see Table 1) for each of 
these variables. 
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The importance of learning a lesson is predicted 
to increase as the amount of the initial investment 
increases because it is most important to avoid re-
peating previous mistakes in high-stakes situations. 
The decision care variable is also clearly related to 
the issue of learning how to make good decisions, 
as decisions that are made thoroughly and carefully 
will on average produce better outcomes than those 
that are not. Thus, we predict that the learn-a-lesson 
response will receive higher ratings when the deci-
sion has been made carelessly because future deci-
sion making could thereby be improved more than 
when the decision was made well but turned out 
poorly anyway.
Whether the decision maker is an adult alone or 
a parent making a decision on behalf of a child is 
also directly relevant to the learn-a-lesson response. 
If lesson learning is used as a justification, then one 
should be more likely to continue with a suboptimal 
plan in order to teach a child a lesson than to teach 
oneself a lesson. Teaching oneself a lesson high-
lights the paradoxical nature of a multiple-self rep-
resentation of decision making (Thaler & Shefrin, 
1981): oneself presumably already knows the les-
son (otherwise, how could one teach it?), whereas a 
child may not yet have had the opportunity to learn 
the lesson.
If punishment serves the same function as learn-
ing a lesson—that is, improving future behavior—
then this response should also be affected by the 
level of initial resources, decision care, and whether 
the decision maker is a single person or a parent 
and child together. With regard to the amount of the 
initial investment, for example, an analogy can be 
drawn from tort law, in which greater deterrence 
(accomplished through the awarding of damages) 
is desired for acts resulting in relatively more harm-
ful consequences (Landes & Posner, 1987). Because 
losing a large initial investment in a sunk cost situa-
tion is more harmful than losing a small investment, 
the attractiveness of punishment for deterrent pur-
poses would be greater in the former case. However, 
we predict that the punishment response will be less 
attractive than the learn-a-lesson response overall 
because the latter contains a clearer explanation of 
the future benefits that will accrue.
The level of resources already invested is also 
predicted to affect ratings of the consistency re-
sponse, on the grounds that it is more important to 
present an image as a competent decision maker 
when the stakes are relatively high than when little 
is at risk (Staw, 1981). With regard to decision care, 
carelessly made decisions might produce a nega-
tive image of the decision maker and thereby cre-
ate greater self-presentation demands; on the other 
hand, a careless decision might lessen self-presen-
tation demands, by providing a convenient excuse 
for the poor outcome that does not necessarily re-
flect a stable behavior pattern. Hence we make no 
prediction relating the care with which a decision 
was made to the consistency rationale. As with de-
cision care, there are competing hypotheses for the 
expected effect of the decision maker on the con-
sistency argument. On the one hand, children are 
less cognizant of self-presentation demands than 
adults (Goffman, 1959), making this argument less 
attractive in the parent–child condition. Yet par-
ents may be more concerned with creating a favor-
Table 1. Predicted Effect of Amount of Invested Resources, Identity of Decision Maker, and 
Decision Care on Five Different Responses
                                                                                        Response
Variable                                 Normative      Waste            Lesson           Consistency          Punishment
Invested resources  
High     
Low     
Decision maker
Parent and child  —  — 
Adult alone  —  — 
Decision care
Carefully  —  — 
Carelessly  —  — 
Note. Check marks indicate the level of each variable for which a response is predicted to receive relatively 
higher ratings. Dash indicates there was no prediction for how that variable should influence ratings of that 
response.
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able presentation for their children than for them-
selves. Therefore, we make no prediction about the 
effect of who the decision maker is on the consis-
tency rationale.
In keeping with the basic sunk cost effect demon-
strated in previous research (e.g., Arkes & Blumer, 
1985; Garland, 1990), we predict that the normative 
response will be rated lower when a high level of re-
sources has already been invested than when the ini-
tial investment was small and that the opposite will 
be true for the waste response. In addition, the nor-
mative response will receive lower ratings when a 
parent and child are making the decision together 
or when the decision was made carelessly. The at-
tractiveness of various reasons for continuing the 
plan is predicted to increase in those circumstances, 
and the attractiveness of an option tends to decrease 
as the attractiveness of a competing alternative in-
creases (Baron, 1994). Finally, we predict that the 
attractiveness of the waste response will not be af-
fected either by the identity of the decision maker or 
by the care with which the decision was made. The 
desire not to waste resources should depend solely 
on the amount of resources that has already been in-




The participants were 80 students from Louisiana 
State University who received course credit.
Materials and design
Eight scenarios were developed (summarized in 
the Appendix), each of which describes a situation 
in which a decision maker has invested resources 
(either time or money, or both) in an initial plan of 
action. Subsequently, circumstances or preferences 
change, forcing the decision maker to choose be-
tween continuing the original plan and switching 
to an alternative plan. For each scenario, eight con-
ditions were constructed by crossing three binary 
variables: (a) amount of resources already invested 
(high or low); (b) decision care (whether the deci-
sion had been made “after careful consideration” or 
“on the spur of the moment”); and (c) the identity of 
the decision maker (whether the decision was made 
by an adult alone or by a parent and child together). 
For example, see Scenario 1 with alternate versions 
in parentheses below:
Agatha (Agatha’s young daughter Becky) decides 
after careful consideration (on the spur of the mo-
ment) that she wants to take cello lessons. Agatha 
spends $1,000 ($100) on a beginner cello and an ad-
ditional $200 ($40) on the first 3 months (1 month) 
of cello lessons. After 3 months (1 month) of les-
sons, Agatha (Becky) realizes that she no longer en-
joys the cello and wants to stop taking lessons. It is 
almost certain that if she signs up for more lessons, 
she will not enjoy them and will never enjoy playing 
the cello. What should Agatha do?
Each participant saw one version of each of the 
eight scenarios. Participants were randomly as-
signed to one of eight counterbalancing conditions, 
such that each participant read a set containing all 
eight scenarios and all combinations of the three 
factors described above. Across sets, the scenarios 
were always presented in the same order; the order 
of the conditions within each set was varied accord-
ing to a Latin-square design, such that each condi-
tion appeared in each ordinal position one eighth of 
the time. Across all participants, all 64 combinations 
of scenarios and conditions were presented. The de-
sign is illustrated in Table 2.
 
Procedure
After reading each scenario, participants rated the 
desirability of all five possible responses, with a 10-
point scale. Previous research on the sunk cost effect 
(e.g., Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Larrick et al., 1990) 
has required participants simply to choose one re-
sponse from two alternatives (i.e., either continue 
the original plan or switch to the new alternative). 
Table 2. Design of Experiment 1
                                                  Scenario
Set  1          2         3        4   5   6       7       8
A  psh  pch  psl  pel  ash  ach  asl  acl
B  pch  psl  pel  ash  ach  asl  acl  psh
C  psl  pel  ash  ach  asl  acl  psh  pch
D  pel  ash  ach  asl  acl  psh  pch psl
E  ash  ach  asl  acl  psh  pch  psl  pel
F  ach  asl  acl  psh  pch  psl  pel  ash
G  asl  acl  psh  pch  psl  pel  ash  ach
H  acl  psh  pch  psl  pel  ash  ach  asl
Note. Letters refer to the level of each of three variables. 
Identity of the decision maker (parent-child = p and adult 
alone = a), decision care (carefully = c and carelessly = s), 
and amount of resources invested (high = h and low = 1).
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We used a rating method to allow an evaluation of 
the different reasons that participants might rely on 
in choosing to continue the original plan. The rat-
ing scale has the additional advantage of permitting 
parametric analyses. The 10-point rating scale was 
anchored at 10, “a very good response, the one that 
[the decision maker] should definitely follow,” and 
1, “a very bad response, that [the decision maker] 
should definitely not follow.” Use of the scale was 
unconstrained; that is, participants were not required 
to allocate a predetermined number of points across 
the five responses, and multiple responses could re-
ceive the same rating.
The five responses—which varied slightly de-
pending on the identity of the decision maker—were 
normative (e.g., “Agatha should [let Becky] stop 
taking cello lessons because it would be a waste of 
time and money to take more lessons that she won’t 
enjoy”); waste (e.g., “Agatha should [make Becky] 
continue with the lessons because otherwise she will 
have wasted the money and time already spent”); 
learn-a-lesson (e.g., “Agatha should [make Becky] 
continue lessons to teach her[self] that next time she 
should be more careful about what hobbies she se-
lects for herself”); punishment (e.g., “if she was 
foolish enough to select a hobby that she doesn’t en-
joy, she deserves to suffer by continuing with her 
lessons”); and consistency (e.g., “if she stops taking 
lessons, that would mean she made a bad decision in 
deciding to take cello lessons. . . . If it was the right 
decision then, it is still the right decision”; modeled 
after an alternative used by Larrick et al., 1990). The 
order of the responses was determined randomly for 
each scenario, with the constraint that each response 
appear in each ordinal position at least once across 
the eight scenarios.
After completing the decision scenarios, partici-
pants provided information on their frequency of en-
gaging in five sunk cost activities (e.g., continuing 
to watch a boring movie).1 The entire questionnaire 
took 20 to 30 min to complete.
Results
Average ratings of the five responses
Four of the responses involved continuing the 
failed plan, whereas only one response (normative) 
involved switching to the new plan. This design may 
result in an overestimation of the tendency for par-
ticipants to stick with the original plan, but it is un-
likely to affect either the ordering of the four “con-
tinue” responses or the effect of the independent 
variables on the response ratings. Table 3 shows 
the average ratings of the five responses and the 
1 Participants provided this information in all three ex-
periments. Each activity was rated on a 1-to-10 scale—with 
high numbers indicating a greater likelihood of abandoning 
a plan that is no longer optimal—and the five ratings were 
averaged to form one score. We examined the correlations 
between these activity scores and ratings of the five types of 
scenario responses. We predicted that activity scores would 
be negatively correlated with waste response ratings and 
positively correlated with normative response ratings. We 
did not obtain any consistent correlations between partici-
pants’ reports of everyday behavior and their questionnaire 
responses.
Table 3. Percentage of Trials Receiving Highest Rating and Mean Ratings With Standard Deviations for 
Each Response
                                                                                Experiment
                                          1                                             2                                               3
Response            %          M              SD           %           M               SD             %            M              SD  
Normative 61.7 6.88*** 3.14 44.9 5.66*** 3.26 62.1 7.07*** 3.06
Waste 15.6 4.76*** 3.03 15.2 4.60 3.07 12.6 4.70*** 2.97
Learn a lesson 8.9 3.79*** 2.84 21.5 4.58*** 2.99 12.9 4.02*** 2.90
Consistency 8.8 3.37*** 2.57 14.6 3.87*** 2.82 8.0 3.36*** 2.49
Punishment 5.0 2.28*** 2.06 3.8 1.82*** 1.75 4.4 2.50*** 2.15
Note. Means were compared with the next lowest response or with the minimum rating of 1 if there was no lower 
response.
***p < .001 to correct for multiple comparisons.
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percentage of trials on which each response was 
rated highest. 
The normative response received the highest 
mean rating (6.88) and was also assigned the high-
est rating on the majority of trials (63%). The waste 
response was given a lower average rating (4.76), 
and the learn-a-lesson response a still lower rat-
ing (3.79). The consistency (3.37) and punishment 
(2.28) responses received the lowest ratings. The 
mean rating for each response was significantly dif-
ferent from all other responses (p < .001).2 In addi-
tion, the order of the four “continue” responses (de-
termined by their mean ratings) was the same both 
for trials where the normative response received the 
highest rating and for trials where one of the “con-
tinue” responses received the highest rating.
The normative response was negatively corre-
lated with each of the four “continue” responses 
(r s ranged from −.30 to −.51, n = 80, p s < .001); 
whereas the four “continue” responses were posi-
tively correlated with one another (r s ranged from 
.41 to .50, p s < .001). Although the learn-a-lesson 
response is conceptually similar to the punishment 
response, the correlation between these two (r = .47) 
was not significantly higher than that between any 
other two “continue” responses. This pattern of cor-
relations was replicated in Experiments 2 and 3.
Effects of decision care, decision maker, and amount 
of invested resources
Each of the five responses was used as the depen-
dent variable in an analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
model containing the between-subjects variable of 
counterbalancing condition (i.e., stimulus set) and 
the within-subjects variables of scenario, decision 
maker (parent–child or adult alone), decision-care 
(carefully or carelessly), and level of invested re-
sources (high or low). Although we did not predict 
any interactions, two-way interactions among the 
latter three variables were included in the models.3 
Mean ratings are presented in Table 4. 
2 For each participant, we also calculated the percent-
age of trials on which that participant rated each response 
highest and then averaged these percentages across partici-
pants (see Table 3). In all three experiments, pairwise com-
parisons of the percentages showed fewer significant differ-
ences than the pairwise comparisons of means, although the 
overall patterns were the same. Most importantly, the per-
centage measure also revealed systematic differences among 
the responses; for example, the learn-a-lesson response was 
rated highest on a significantly greater percentage of trials 
than the punishment response in all three experiments; Ex-
periment 1: t (79) = 1.87; p < .07; Experiments 2 and 3: t s > 
4.3; p s < .001. We limit our discussion to the analyses of re-
sponse means.
3 The counterbalancing variable of stimulus set did not 
have an effect in any of the three experiments. An addi-
tional counterbalancing measure, presentation order—used 
only in Experiment 3—also did not affect participants’ re-
sponses. However, in all three experiments there was a main 
effect of scenario. Separate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) 
within each scenario indicated stronger manipulation effects 
for some scenarios than others; however, these effects were 
not systematic across experiments. Other researchers (e.g., 
Frisch, 1993) have also demonstrated differences between 
alternate sunk cost scenarios. As we were interested in gen-
eralities instead of responses to particular cases, we do not 
Table 4. Mean Response Ratings With Standard Deviations for Experiment 1
                                                                                            Response
                                            Normative              Waste                    Lesson           Consistency         Punishment
Variable                              M           SD          M          SD           M          SD          M         SD          M        SD 
Invested resources   
   High 6.50 3.24 5.12** 3.05 4.05** 2.92 3.55** 2.63 2.49** 2.28
   Low 7.27** 2.98 4.39 2.96 3.52 2.73 3.20 2.51 2.07 1.79
Decision maker    
   Parent and child 6.28 3.25 4.86 3.09 4.56** 3.02 3.57** 2.73 2.61** 2.33
   Adult alone 7.49** 2.89 4.66 2.96 3.01 2.40 3.16 2.39 1.94 1.68
Decision care    
   Carefully 6.92 3.13 4.66 2.86 3.62 2.78 3.33 2.54 2.25 2.06
   Carelessly 6.84 3.14 4.86 3.18 3.96* 2.89 3.40 2.61 2.31 2.06
*p < .07.   **p < .05.
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As in other research (e.g., Arkes & Blumer, 
1985; Garland, 1990), the waste response was rated 
as more appropriate when a large amount of re-
sources had been sunk into the project than when a 
small amount had been invested, F(1, 540) = 15.17, 
p < .0001. Conversely, the normative response was 
viewed as more appropriate when a small amount of 
resources had been sunk into the project than when a 
large amount had been invested, F(1, 540) = 13.95, 
p < .0001. As predicted, the normative response was 
also viewed as more appropriate when the decision 
maker was an adult acting alone than when a par-
ent and child acted together, F(1, 540) = 32.91, p < 
.0001, but contrary to our hypothesis, it was not af-
fected by decision care (F < 1). Consistent with our 
predictions, ratings of the waste response were af-
fected by neither decision care nor the identity of 
the decision maker.
The mean rating for the learn-a-lesson response 
for decisions made by a parent and child together 
was higher than for decisions made by an adult 
alone, F(1, 540) = 73.39, p < .0001. Figure 1 shows 
learn-a-lesson ratings for decisions made carefully 
or carelessly, plotted as a function of level of re-
sources already invested. There was a main effect 
of invested resources, indicating higher ratings 
with a high level of investment, F(1, 540) = 8.46, p 
< .01. Also of interest, although the main effect of 
decision care was only marginally significant, F(1, 
540) = 3.53, p < .07, there was an interaction be-
tween decision care and level of resources invested, 
F(1, 540) = 6.78, p < .01, indicating that for a high 
level of sunk cost (but not for a low level), the les-
son response was rated higher for decisions made 
carelessly. 
Consistency and punishment ratings both showed 
main effects indicating higher ratings for a high ver-
sus a low level of invested resources and for a par-
ent and child acting together versus an adult alone, 
F s(1, 539) > 4.7, p s < .03.
This general pattern of results was not limited 
to the parent–child scenarios. For example, within 
the adult-alone condition, the learn-a-lesson re-
sponse was still perceived as more appropriate than 
the punishment response, t (316) = 8.26, p < .001, 
and roughly as good as the consistency response, t 
(316) = −1.19, p > .2; in addition, it was rated higher 
for careless than for careful decisions, F(1, 227) = 
10.57, p < .005.
Discussion
These results clearly demonstrate the classic sunk 
cost effect. All four responses advocating the con-
tinuation of the original plan received higher rat-
ings when a relatively large amount of resources 
had already been invested. In contrast, the norma-
tive response advocating termination of the orig-
inal plan received higher ratings when a relatively 
small amount of resources had been invested. Rea-
sons underlying the sunk cost effect can be deter-
mined by examining the ratings of the four contin-
uation responses. Although the waste response had 
the highest rating of the four, indicating that a desire 
discuss scenario effects further. Higher order interactions 
were not included in the ANOVA models because they were 
not predicted by prior theory and would not be readily in-
terpretable. For this and subsequent experiments, we also 
computed logistic regression analyses where the dependent 
variable for each of the five responses was whether that re-
sponse received the highest rating. Because some of the re-
sponses virtually never received the highest rating of the five 
responses (e.g., punishment), we report only the ANOVA re-
sults on mean ratings, which showed the same general pat-
tern of effects as the logistic regression analyses.
Figure 1.  Mean ratings of the learn-a-lesson response with 
standard errors for Experiment 1 shown as a function of 
level of invested resources (high or low) and decision care 
(decision made carelessly or carefully)
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to avoid wastefulness is the primary motivation be-
hind sunk cost behavior (Frisch, 1993; Teger, 1980), 
the learn-a-lesson response received the next high-
est rating, indicating that it too can be an important 
justification.
In addition, the attractiveness of the learn-a-les-
son response was influenced by two variables pre-
dicted to affect the appropriateness of this argument. 
Learning a lesson was viewed as more appropri-
ate when a parent had an opportunity to teach a les-
son to a child than for an adult alone and when the 
original decision had been made carelessly rather 
than carefully. A child is less likely to have already 
learned the lesson and has a longer life expectancy 
in which to benefit from the lesson compared with 
an adult. In addition, the parent–child situation pro-
vides social roles encouraging lesson teaching and 
also makes explicit the two selves involved in the 
decision. The normative response to switch to a new 
plan is correspondingly less attractive in parent–
child situations.
Learning a lesson is more effective when a deci-
sion has been made carelessly because the decision 
maker has the opportunity to learn to be more careful. 
There may be no way to improve future decisions if 
the original decision was already made carefully. This 
suggests that participants are sensitive to the manner 
in which the original decision was made, as well as to 
the relationship between decision quality and decision 
outcome. Furthermore, a careless decision is of lit-
tle consequence if it does not waste many resources; 
thus, learning a lesson is more important when care-
less decisions have incurred large costs.
This result suggests a continuum from trivial de-
cisions (those involving few resources) to monumen-
tal decisions (involving extensive resources). Learn-
ing to make trivial decisions carefully is not worth 
the trouble, as it will save few future resources. In 
making a decision, factors other than the accuracy 
of the decision’s outcome—such as the time and ef-
fort expended in making the decision—also need to 
be considered (Baron, 1994; Kunda, 1990; Shugan, 
1980). In contrast, learning to make important de-
cisions carefully is well worth the effort. Thus, al-
though learning a lesson is influenced by the waste 
of resources, it is the waste of future resources, not 
past ones, that drives this argument. Consequently, 
what appears on the surface to be traditional sunk 
cost (and therefore irrational) reasoning can be jus-
tified because of its beneficial effects on future deci-
sion making.
However, just as ignoring sunk costs is not al-
ways the optimal response, continuing a failed plan 
in order to learn a lesson will not always be opti-
mal either. In some situations, the cost of continuing 
will simply be too great. In deciding whether to con-
tinue or switch, one must weigh the costs and bene-
fits of the two options (Staw & Ross, 1987). When 
the initial investment is large and the original deci-
sion was made carelessly, the long-term benefit of 
learning a lesson will often outweigh the cost of in-
vesting additional resources. Whether it does in a 
particular situation will depend on factors such as 
the amount of additional resources required and the 
likelihood of making a similar decision in the future 
(i.e., the probability that one will be able to use the 
lesson learned).
The learn-a-lesson response received higher over-
all ratings than both the punishment and consistency 
arguments. It was viewed favorably both for a parent 
deciding with a child and for an adult acting alone. 
In addition, the effect of decision maker was larg-
est for this response, and it was the only response 
influenced by decision-making level of care, which 
otherwise had no effect on ratings of the various re-
sponses. These results point to the importance of 
learning a lesson in explaining sunk cost behavior. 
Consequently, in Experiments 2 and 3, we explored 
the learn-a-lesson response further by focusing on 
additional variables that might have an impact on its 
attractiveness as an argument for continuing a failed 
plan.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, the age of the child was not 
specified beyond characterizing the child as “young” 
to indicate a minor. If it is beneficial to teach a child 
a lesson, it seems reasonable to assume that this 
benefit will increase as the child’s age decreases. 
Younger children’s behavior patterns are less fully 
determined, so they are generally viewed as more 
malleable; they have had less opportunity to be 
taught the lesson already; and simply because they 
are younger, any learning will have a potentially 
greater payoff spread out over their expected lifes-
pan. In Experiment 2, we manipulated the age of the 
child involved in a sunk cost situation to test the hy-
pothesis that the learn-a-lesson response is more de-
sirable for relatively young children. It can be ar-
gued that the learn-a-lesson response is actually less 
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desirable for very young children because they may 
be too young to learn to think more carefully before 
making future decisions. However, Elias, Branden-
Muller, and Sayette (1991) have found that even el-
ementary schoolchildren can learn how to improve 
their decision making. Consequently, the scenarios 
in Experiment 2 described children who were ele-
mentary school age or older.
Because of the conflicting literature on the effect 
of personal responsibility on the sunk cost effect 
(Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Staw, 1976; Whyte, 1993), 
we also varied whether the participant took the per-
spective of the decision maker or merely made a 
recommendation for a decision maker portrayed as a 
hypothetical other.
Method
Participants. The participants were 79 students 
at Louisiana State University who received extra 
course credit.
Materials and design. The parent–child versions 
of the four scenarios for which the learn-a-lesson ef-
fect was strongest in Experiment 1 were used. There 
were four different versions of each scenario, which 
resulted from crossing the two variables of amount 
of initial investment (same as Experiment 1) and 
age of the learner (7 or 8 years old vs. 15 or 16). 
Two younger ages and two older ages were used to 
make the within-subject manipulation of the learn-
er’s age less transparent. The same counterbalanc-
ing procedures were used as in Experiment 1, yield-
ing four separate stimulus sets that each contained 
all four experimental conditions.
The perspective of the decision maker was added 
as a wholly between-subjects variable. Half of the 
participants were instructed to imagine themselves 
as the decision maker. These participants read sce-
narios referring to “you”; for example, “Your daugh-
ter Becky wants to take cello lessons.” They an-
swered the question, “What would you do?” in that 
situation. The remaining participants read scenarios 
describing another person; for example, “Agatha’s 
daughter Becky wants to take cello lessons.” They 
were asked, “What should Agatha do?”
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in 
Experiment 1 with the sole exception that partici-
pants read and rated four instead of eight sunk cost 
scenarios.
Results and Discussion
Average ratings of the five responses. The over-
all rankings of the responses were the same as in 
Experiment 1 (see Table 3). The normative re-
sponse received the highest mean rating (5.66) and 
was also assigned the highest rating more often than 
any other response (45%). The waste response was 
given a lower average rating (4.60) and was rated 
highest on 15% of the trials. The learn-a-lesson re-
sponse was given a similar average rating (4.58) 
and was assigned the highest rating on 22% of the 
trials, suggesting that this argument was the primary 
motivation behind sunk cost behavior. The compar-
atively high ratings assigned to the lesson response 
in this experiment were likely due to the fact that it 
had only parent–child scenarios. The consistency 
and punishment responses received average ratings 
of 3.87 and 1.82, respectively.
Effects of perspective, age of learner, and amount 
of invested resources. Each of the five responses 
was used as the dependent variable in an ANOVA 
containing the between-subjects variable of perspec-
tive of the decision maker (decision made by self 
or other) and the within-subjects variables of age of 
child and level of invested resources, as well as the 
two-way interactions among all three variables. Ta-
ble 5 shows the mean response for each level of per-
spective, age, and amount of resources. 
As in Experiment 1, the normative response was 
rated as more appropriate when a small amount of 
resources had been sunk into the project than when 
a large amount had been invested, F(1, 229) = 6.26, 
p < .02; whereas the waste response was rated as 
more appropriate when a large amount of resources 
had been invested compared with a relatively small 
amount, F(1, 229) = 6.04, p < .02. The normative 
and waste responses did not show any effect of per-
spective or age of child (F s < 1). However, the 
waste response showed an interaction between per-
spective and age of child, F(1, 229) = 3.95, p < .05, 
indicating higher ratings for an older child in the 
“other” condition (5.09 vs. 4.49), but higher ratings 
for a younger child in the “self” condition (4.62 vs. 
4.22).
As in Experiment 1, ratings for the learn-a-lesson 
response were higher for a high level of invested re-
sources, F(1, 229) = 9.59, p < .01. There was no sig-
nificant main effect of perspective, F(1, 74) = 1.10, 
p > .29, or of age of child (F < 1). Thus, participants 
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did not view learning a lesson as more appropriate 
for younger children. Finally, consistency and pun-
ishment ratings did not show any effects of perspec-
tive, age of child, or level of invested resources, F 
s(1, 229) < 2.3, p s > .13.
The sole effect of the self–other distinction was 
an interaction between perspective and age of child 
on ratings of the waste response. Although this in-
teraction seemed to suggest that perspective is im-
portant when it comes to dealing with children 
(i.e., one’s own are treated differently from some-
one else’s), we caution against drawing any conclu-
sions because of our failure to replicate it in ratings 
of any of the other responses. As Arkes and Blumer 
(1985) noted, it is difficult to construct a valid ma-
nipulation of personal involvement with question-
naire studies, as opposed to observations of genu-
inely consequential behavior. When responsibility 
is manipulated by varying whether the present deci-
sion maker or someone else made the usually hypo-
thetical initial investment, the decision maker’s de-
cision to continue or switch is affected (e.g., Staw, 
1976; Staw & Ross, 1977; Whyte, 1993); but when 
responsibility is manipulated by varying the partic-
ipant’s perspective (i.e., whether the present deci-
sion maker is the participant or a third party), it has 
less or no effect (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). Because 
learning a lesson would not be feasible in the former 
case—where the original decision maker may not be 
involved in the current decision—the present exper-
iment manipulated the decision maker’s perspective. 
Our failure to demonstrate an effect of perspective 
reflects the subtle nature of personal responsibility 
effects in this domain.
Although there is reason to predict that learning a 
lesson would be especially beneficial for a younger 
child, in Experiment 2 we found no effect of the 
child’s age. This failure may indicate that there are 
other reasons beside a child’s age as to why parent–
child scenarios are particularly likely to evoke learn-
a-lesson arguments. This possibility is explored in 
Experiment 3.
Experiment 3
An alternative explanation for why it is more 
important to teach a lesson to a child rather than 
oneself is that parents have a fiduciary responsi-
bility to children that involves teaching lessons. In 
contrast, adults are not usually viewed as having a 
social responsibility to teach lessons to themselves. 
This explanation implies that teaching a lesson 
would be rated highly in other teacher–learner situ-
ations, even if the learner were not a young person. 
Although teaching a lesson might occur in adult–
adult relationships as well, the learn-a-lesson ra-
tionale should be particularly attractive in a par-
ent–child relationship, owing to parents’ special 
responsibilities.
Experiment 3 was designed to test this hypoth-
esis. Four scenarios from Experiment 1 were used. 
An additional four scenarios that involved adult 
learners were created. Therefore, one experimen-
tal factor was the type of scenario: half the scenar-
ios described a situation that contained either a child 
learner or an adult alone, and half described situa-
tions involving either an adult learner or an adult 
alone. Thus, within each scenario, a second factor 
Table 5. Mean Response Ratings With Standard Deviations for Experiment 2
                                                                                   Response
                                Normative            Waste             Lesson           Consistency       Punishment
Variable                  M        SD         M          SD       M         SD        M         SD           M      SD
Invested resources
   High 5.27 3.16 4.93** 3.22 5.01** 3.04 3.88 2.83 1.82 1.78
   Low 6.03** 3.32 4.27 2.89 4.14 2.88 3.87 2.82 1.82 1.72
Age of child
   Younger 5.61 3.34 4.56 3.06 4.50 2.94 3.84 2.87 1.79 1.74
   Older 5.70 3.18 4.65 3.10 4.65 3.04 3.91 2.78 1.82 1.77
Perspective
   Other 5.46 3.06 4.79 2.97 4.78 3.00 3.89 2.74 1.89 1.75
   Self 5.84 3.45 4.42 3.17 4.38 2.98 3.86 2.90 1.75 1.76
**p < .05.
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was whether a teacher had an opportunity to teach 
a lesson to a learner or whether a single adult acted 
alone. A third within-scenario factor was the level 
of cost already sunk into the project. Participants re-
sponded to all eight scenarios and saw all combina-
tions of the three factors.
Method
Participants. Participants were 86 undergraduate 
students at Louisiana State University who received 
extra course credit.
Materials and design. Eight scenarios were used. 
Four had been used in Experiment 1; the remaining 
four scenarios were new ones that described either 
a single adult or 2 adults making a decision together 
(see Appendix). For example, see Scenario 12 with 
alternate versions in parentheses below:
Leroy is a private in the Army. His commanding of-
ficer, Jim, orders Leroy to figure out (and report to him) 
the best way to catalog all of the weapons in a large store-
house. . . . He must work alone, and without supervision 
(or must have his commanding officer’s approval). . . . Af-
ter working on the job for 2 weeks (or 2 months), Leroy 
figures out a new method that will allow him to do the 
whole job, from start to finish, in only 4 weeks. It will take 
another 2 months to finish doing the inventory the original 
way. (Leroy needs his commanding officer Jim’s approval 
to change methods.) What should Leroy (or Jim) do?
It was not possible to construct plausible adult–
child and adult–adult versions of the same scenario. 
Consequently, rather than comparing an adult–adult 
scenario directly with an adult–child scenario, each 
was compared with its own adult-alone control con-
dition. The perspective in all scenarios was such 
that participants were asked, “What should [the de-
cision maker] do?” as in Experiment 1. There were 
four versions of each scenario, which resulted from 
crossing the factors of the identity of the decision 
maker (teacher and learner versus adult alone) and 
the amount of the original investment (high versus 
low).
The two scenario types—parent–child/adult alone 
and adult–adult/adult alone—were presented in al-
ternating order. The presentation order of the re-
maining conditions was counterbalanced by a partial 
Latin-square design, which yielded four different 
questionnaire sets. Although the order of the scenar-
ios within each set was fixed, half of the participants 
completed each set in forward order, and half com-
pleted the set in backward order (see Footnote 3 on 
p. 257). Thus, each of the eight conditions appeared 
in each ordinal position an equal proportion of the 
time. Each participant responded to all eight scenar-
ios and all combinations of the three variables.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that 
used in Experiments 1 and 2.
Results and Discussion
Average ratings of the five responses. The overall 
ranking of the responses was the same as in Experi-
ments 1 and 2 (see Table 3). The normative response 
received the highest mean rating (7.07) and was also 
assigned the highest rating on the majority of trials 
(62%). The waste response was given a lower aver-
age rating (4.70), and the learn-a-lesson response a 
still lower rating (4.02). The consistency (3.36) and 
punishment (2.50) responses received the lowest av-
erage ratings.
Effects of decision maker, type of scenario, and 
amount of invested resources. Each of the five re-
sponses was used as the dependent variable in an 
ANOVA containing the within-subjects variables of 
type of scenario (adult–adult/adult alone or parent–
child/adult alone), decision maker (teacher–learner 
or adult alone), and level of invested resources, and 
two-way interactions among these variables. If the 
parent–child relationship is especially conducive to 
teaching a lesson, compared with adult–adult rela-
tionships, then learn-a-lesson ratings would show 
a significant interaction between scenario type and 
decision maker, indicating a greater effect of hav-
ing a teacher and a learner (opposed to an adult 
alone) when the teacher and learner are parent and 
child. Conversely, ratings of the normative response 
should yield an interaction in the opposite direction. 
Mean responses are shown in Table 6.
 As in Experiments 1 and 2, the waste response 
was rated as more appropriate, F(1, 590) = 5.91, p 
< .02, when a large (compared with a small) amount 
of resources had been sunk into the project; and the 
normative response was rated as more appropri-
ate for a low compared with a high level of invested 
resources, although the latter effect was only mar-
ginally significant, F(1, 590) = 2.92, p < .09. As in 
Experiment 1, the normative response was rated as 
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more appropriate when an adult acted alone than 
when a teacher and learner decided together, F(1, 
590) = 24.71, p < .0001. It was rated similarly for 
adult–adult/adult-alone scenarios and for parent–
child/adult-alone scenarios, F(1, 6) < 1. 4 As pre-
dicted, there was a significant interaction between 
type of scenario and decision maker, F(1, 590) = 
3.78, p = .05 (see Figure 2), indicating that although 
the normative response was always more appropri-
ate for single decision makers, this effect was espe-
cially pronounced when the teacher–learner version 
of the scenario involved a child. Thus, the norma-
tive response was least attractive when there was a 
child learner. 
In corroborating the first two experiments, we 
found that the learn-a-lesson response was viewed 
as more appropriate for large amounts of invested 
resources, F(1, 590) = 11.85, p < .001. It was also 
rated higher when a teacher had an opportunity to 
teach a lesson to a learner than when the decision 
maker was acting alone, F(1, 590) = 34.65, p < 
.0001, replicating Experiment 1. As in Experiment 
1, this overall pattern of results was not due simply 
to the teacher–learner condition. Within the adult-
alone condition, the learn-a-lesson response was 
perceived as more appropriate than both the punish-
ment, t (344) = 10.43, p < .001, and consistency re-
sponses, t (344) = 2.36, p < .02.
The type of scenario had no main effect on learn-
a-lesson ratings, F(2, 6) < 1, whereas the interaction 
between type of scenario and decision maker was 
marginally significant, F(1, 590) = 3.44, p < .07. 
As predicted, the difference between the teacher–
learner and adult-alone conditions was larger for the 
scenarios in which the learner was a child (M = 4.79 
vs. 3.52, respectively) than for scenarios in which 
the learner was an adult (M = 4.22 vs. 3.56, respec-
tively; see Figure 2). Thus, teaching a lesson is seen 
as more appropriate for a child learner than for an 
adult learner. This interaction is consistent with the 
normative response ratings: the learn-a-lesson argu-
ment is most attractive and the normative response 
least attractive when there is a learner present and 
that learner is a child.
As predicted, even in the case of adult learn-
ers, teaching a lesson is a more appropriate ratio-
nale when two people are involved. Pairwise com-
parisons indicated that the learn-a-lesson response 
was rated higher in both the parent–child and adult 
teacher–adult learner conditions than in their respec-
tive adult-alone control conditions, F s(1, 591) > 
8.0, p s < .01. In other words, the participants be-
lieved that one can teach an old dog a new trick.
The pattern of results for the punishment and con-
sistency responses was very similar to that obtained 
in Experiment 1. The punishment response received 
higher ratings for the high relative to the low level 
of invested resources, F(1, 590) = 7.47, p < .01; for 
the consistency response, this effect was only mar-
ginally significant, F(1, 590) = 3.10, p < .08. Like 
the lesson response, the consistency and punishment 
responses were both rated higher when a teacher 
Table 6. Mean Response Ratings With Standard Deviations for Experiment 3
                                                                                                 Response
                                                Normative          Waste                 Lesson           Consistent       Punishment
Variable                                  M        SD         M         SD         M         SD        M        SD         M        SD    
Invested resources
   High 6.92 3.13 4.91** 3.00 4.31** 2.97 3.49 2.51 2.67** 2.31
   Low 7.23 2.99 4.49 2.93 3.74 2.81 3.23 2.47 2.32 1.97
Decision maker
   Teacher and learner 6.62 3.19 4.87 3.04 4.51** 3.05 3.51** 2.57 2.80** 2.38
   Adult alone 7.53** 2.87 4.54 2.89 3.54 2.66 3.20 2.40 2.19 1.85
Type of scenario
   Parent-child/control 6.85 3.15 4.82 2.98 4.16 2.89 3.44 2.55 2.55 2.18
   2 adults/control 7.30** 2.96 4.58 2.96 3.89 2.91 3.27 2.43 2.45 2.13
**p < .05.
4 For the main effect of scenario type, we used the quasi F 
ratio recommended by Winer (1971) and Clark (1973), which 
incorporates the variance due to scenarios within each type.
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had an opportunity to teach a lesson to a learner than 
when an adult acted alone, F s(1, 590) > 4.4, p s < 
.05, but the interactions with scenario type were not 
significant.
General Discussion
In all three experiments, the normative response 
was rated lower when a high level of resources had 
already been invested into the current project com-
pared with a small initial investment; the opposite 
was true for the waste response. This result repli-
cates the basic sunk cost effect demonstrated by 
Arkes and Blumer (1985) and others (e.g., Gar-
land, 1990; Thaler, 1980). Although “throwing good 
money after bad” is usually perceived as an indica-
tion of biased or irrational thinking (Baron, 1990), 
we were able to uncover potentially rational reasons 
for engaging in sunk cost behavior. In addition to 
the traditional desire not to waste already expended 
resources, we explored three factors that might ex-
plain perseverance with a plan that is no longer opti-
mal: the opportunity to learn a lesson, the provision 
of punishment as a possible deterrent, and the desire 
to appear consistent.
Across the three experiments, participants’ ratings 
showed a consistent preference for the normative re-
sponse (i.e., switch to the alternative), followed in 
descending order by the following arguments for 
continuing the original plan: waste, learn-a-les-
son, consistency, and punishment. Overall, choos-
ing a non-normative response was quite common; 
across experiments, participants chose to continue 
the original plan an average of 43% of the time, a 
figure that is comparable with that found in previous 
studies (e.g., Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Larrick et al., 
1990). More important than the overall frequency of 
sunk cost behavior, participants’ willingness to en-
dorse each possible argument varied as a function 
of a number of variables. In all three experiments, 
variables that increased the attractiveness of the var-
ious reasons for continuing the original plan made 
the normative response appear correspondingly less 
appropriate.
The waste response was affected only by the level 
of invested resources. Participants’ greater disincli-
Figure 2. Mean ratings of the learn-a-lesson and normative responses with standard errors for Ex-
periment 3 shown as a function of scenario type (parent–child/adult alone or adult–adult/adult alone) 
and number of decision makers (adult alone or teacher–learner).
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nation to waste additional resources as the amount 
already invested increased is consistent with pros-
pect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 
1980). However, prospect theory does not predict 
an effect of variables such as whether the decision 
maker acted alone, the care with which the decision 
was made, or the nature of the relationship between 
teacher and learner. The other three responses were 
influenced by these variables.
The opportunity to learn a lesson was the stron-
gest of the remaining alternatives. The learn-a-lesson 
response received higher ratings in situations where 
learning a lesson would be especially beneficial or 
appropriate. In Experiments 1 and 3, higher learn-
a-lesson ratings occurred when a teacher had an op-
portunity to teach a lesson to a learner than when 
someone acted alone. To teach oneself a lesson, one 
must already know it, making the teaching paradox-
ical. Nevertheless, this “multiple self” approach (El-
ster, 1986; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981) is supported by 
the fairly high ratings received by the learn-a-lesson 
response compared with two other possible ratio-
nales (i.e., punishment and consistency), even when 
an adult acted alone.
In Experiment 2, the attractiveness of the learn-
a-lesson response for teacher–learner scenarios 
was not influenced by the age of the learner or by 
whether the subject adopted the perspective of the 
teacher or of a third party. In Experiment 3, the 
teacher–learner effect extended to adult learners 
as well. The implication of these results is that the 
lesson response is viewed as more appropriate in 
teacher–learner situations not merely because of the 
learner’s youth, but because of the social role that 
makes teaching a lesson appropriate. Nonetheless, 
the learn-a-lesson response was rated as more ap-
propriate when the teacher and learner were parent 
and child rather than two adults, suggesting that the 
parent–child relationship is especially conducive to 
teaching a lesson. Parents’ teaching role might be 
expected to lead them to instruct their children to 
ignore sunk costs and thereby make more cost-ef-
fective decisions (Baron, 1990). However, the re-
sults of the present experiments suggest that this 
tendency can be overridden by the long-term bene-
fits that are derived from forcing a continuation of 
the original plan—namely, teaching the child a use-
ful lesson that will improve the child’s future deci-
sion making.
A final influence on ratings of the lesson re-
sponse was revealed in Experiment 1, which dem-
onstrated that learn-a-lesson ratings were higher 
when the original decision had involved a large 
cost and had been made carelessly. In this situa-
tion, learning to think more carefully would have 
a particularly high benefit by improving future de-
cisions and saving large amounts of resources. In 
such cases, continuing a previous course of ac-
tion may be rational in the long-term, though more 
costly in the short-term, because of its effect on fu-
ture decision making.
The ratings of the consistency and punishment 
arguments indicate that the effect of having a sep-
arate learner is not specific to the learn-a-lesson ar-
gument, but also generalizes to other arguments for 
why decision makers should experience the conse-
quences of their failed decisions. As predicted, the 
importance of appearing a consistent decision maker 
increased as the stakes involved increased. The other 
variable that affected ratings of the consistency re-
sponse was whether the decision maker acted alone 
or in concert with another. This result suggests that 
parents (or other teachers) are more concerned with 
the learner’s appearing consistent than they are with 
viewing themselves as consistent.
In Experiments 1 and 3, ratings of the punishment 
argument were also influenced by the amount of the 
initial investment and whether the decision maker 
acted alone. As predicted, this response seemed 
more attractive when the investment was relatively 
high and the decision maker was acting on behalf of 
another person. It is interesting to note that the pun-
ishment and learn-a-lesson arguments were affected 
in the same way by these two variables. Teaching 
a lesson and punishment can effectively serve the 
same purpose: improving the quality of one’s future 
decisions. Despite this conceptual relationship, rat-
ings of the learn-a-lesson and punishment responses 
were no more highly correlated than any other pair 
of responses. Punishment may also involve mere 
retribution without a clear explication of its deter-
rent effects on future decision making. The gener-
ally higher ratings for learning a lesson than for pun-
ishment suggest that the former is a more obvious 
means of improving future behavior. Additional re-
search is called for that explores how the framing of 
punishment (i.e., as either a beneficial lesson or as 
just desserts) would affect the attractiveness of this 
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argument. A related topic for future research is what 
reasons subjects themselves would give for sunk 
cost behavior, if reasons were not provided by the 
experimenter.
The importance of learning a lesson does not ap-
ply to all sunk cost situations. For example, there is 
no clear benefit to teaching oneself a lesson in cases 
where someone else made the initial investment or 
where one is forced to choose between two identical 
purchases that differ only in the amount that each 
one cost (cf. Arkes & Blumer, 1985, Experiment 6). 
However, sunk cost situations frequently present an 
opportunity for the decision maker to learn a lesson. 
As Brockner and Rubin (1985) pointed out, “En-
trapment—under certain special circumstances at 
least—can be construed as a phenomenon that can 
serve constructive ends” (p. 255). In judging the ra-
tionality of sunk cost behavior, one needs to weigh 
the costs and benefits of the options to switch or 
to continue, where those costs and benefits are not 
limited to measurable resources such as money and 
time. In many situations, the costs of continuing will 
outweigh the potential benefits—for example, if lit-
tle was invested initially, continuing would exhaust 
all of one’s remaining resources, the initial decision 
was carefully thought out, and the decision maker is 
unlikely to encounter a similar situation in the fu-
ture. On the other hand, if the long-term benefits of 
learning and implementing the lesson outweigh the 
immediate costs of sticking to the original plan, then 
sunk cost behavior does not represent fallacious 
reasoning.
In commenting on “the rhetoric of irrationality,” 
Lopes (1991) noted an overemphasis in the judg-
ment and decision-making literature on the nega-
tive aspects of people’s performance and a com-
parative neglect of situations in which they reason 
well (see also Christensen-Szalanski & Beach, 
1984). What appears to be a bias in the labora-
tory may be functional behavior in a more realis-
tic context (Funder, 1987; Hogarth, 1981), where 
a variety of justifications for the behavior can be 
considered. In general, ignoring sunk costs is an 
adaptive, cost-effective strategy. Yet what appears 
to be biased, irrational behavior—such as decreas-
ing utility through attention to irretrievably wasted 
resources—can be described as “meta-rational” 
(Jungermann, 1986), assuming the benefits of 
learning and implementing the lesson outweigh the 
costs of sticking to the original plan. However, it 
raises the interesting question of why continuing a 
failed plan is the best (or even a good) way to learn 
to make better decisions in the future. Perhaps one 
could both abandon the current unsuccessful plan 
and learn to think more carefully in future deci-
sions. However, we argue that continuing with the 
unsuccessful plan is a particularly effective means 
of learning the lesson because the consequences of 
one’s original decision are then “in-kind,” thereby 
providing better feedback than merely noting that 
the original decision was made badly. In support of 
this conclusion, other research has shown that de-
cision makers prefer punishments that fit the crime 
(Beattie & Baron, 1995).
Sunk cost behavior occurs in a variety of do-
mains. Although the present studies, like most 
demonstrations of the phenomenon, have a labo-
ratory setting, numerous examples can be drawn 
from real-world behavior. People’s tendency to al-
low past decisions to influence current ones in a 
suboptimal fashion has been observed in inter-
personal relationships (Brockner & Rubin, 1985); 
in political decision making (Janis, 1982; Teger, 
1980); and in real organizational settings, where it 
can lead to escalation of commitment in financial 
decisions (Ross & Staw, 1993; Staw, 1981), per-
formance appraisals (Schoorman, 1988), and group 
policy decisions (Brockner & Rubin, 1985; Janis, 
1982). Thus, it is clearly important to understand 
why such behavior occurs, so that decision mak-
ing in these and other situations might ultimately 
be improved.
Staw and Ross (1987) identified a number of pro-
cedures for reducing escalation behavior, such as bi-
furcating initial and subsequent decision making 
and lessening the consequences of failed decisions. 
Another technique that they suggested is to provide 
decision makers with negative feedback. An effec-
tive means of doing so would be for the decision 
maker to experience the negative consequences of 
the failed decision—in other words, to learn through 
failure. The importance of negative feedback in 
skill acquisition has been amply demonstrated in 
the learning literature (e.g., Bilodeau, 1969), and it 
has recently been applied to acquiring knowledge in 
complex domains such as medicine (Clancey, 1987). 
Thus, experiencing the consequences of a failed de-
cision can be a very effective instructional device 
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for learning how to make better decisions in the fu-
ture. 5 This approach is likely to be especially at-
tractive in the early stages of learning, as in training 
a new employee; a more senior employee ought to 
have learned the lesson already. Those interested in 
improving decisions should emphasize all the con-
sequences of continuing a plan, including learning a 
lesson. Our results suggest that in teaching decision 
makers to use better strategies, experiencing the con-
sequences of one’s actions can be used as one means 
of self-improvement.
In summary, decision makers may continue with 
unwise plans for reasons not previously considered. 
Because an initial investment of time or money in 
many situations is made under conditions of uncer-
tainty, it is possible to improve decision making in 
such situations. A decision to continue with a failed 
plan is sometimes justified by the desire to teach the 
decision maker to be more careful in making fu-
ture decisions. This response is attractive whether 
the potential learner is a young child, an older child, 
an adult, or even oneself. Finally, learning a lesson 
is perceived as especially important when the origi-
nal decision has been made carelessly and relatively 
large resources have been invested, or when an adult 
teacher has the opportunity to teach a lesson to a 
child.
5 One need not experience failure personally in order to 
learn the lesson; rather, one can also learn to make better de-
cisions in sunk cost situations by observing a model con-
tinue a failed plan and then display regret at having done so 
(Brockner et al., 1984). However, an appropriate model is 
unlikely to be available much of the time.
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1. Agatha’s young daughter Becky decides to take 
cello lessons. After Agatha buys a cello and pays for 
lessons ($1,200 for 3 months vs. $140 for 1 month), 
Becky finds she is no longer interested and wants to 
quit.
2. Dan’s young daughter Edith selects a video to 
rent. After Dan pays for it and they watch the begin-
ning ($4 for 45 min vs. $.99 for 10 min), Edith real-
izes she is not enjoying the movie and wants to turn 
it off.
3. Ira’s young daughter Jill selects a school proj-
ect. After Ira buys supplies and helps Jill work on it 
(1 month vs. 1 week), Jill discovers a better project 
that will take less time to complete.
4. At his urging, Harriet buys football tickets ($35 
vs. $8) for her son George. Later, George’s favorite 
player is hurt, so he doesn’t want to go to the game.
5. After a large meal, Paul asks his parents to buy 
him a chocolate souffle ($7.95 vs. $1.50). After a 
few bites he finds he is too full to finish it.
6. At his son’s request, Max buys ballet tickets 
($80 vs. $15) for his son Luis. A week later, Luis is 
invited to a party at the same time as the ballet. Luis 
would prefer to go to the party.
7. Young Nathan urges his father Oscar to drive (4 
hr vs. 30 min) to a state park for a hike. When they 
arrive it has turned cold and rainy. Nathan would not 
enjoy the planned hike and wants to go home.
8. Young Sonya joins the soccer team. After her 
mother Robin buys soccer equipment and Sonya at-
tends several practices ($90 and 2 months vs. $25 
and 1 week), Sonya decides she would rather play 
softball.
9. Colleen agrees to pay for bridge lessons ($250 
vs. $50) for her elderly mother Sylvia. After several 
weeks of lessons, Sylvia loses interest and wants to 
quit.
10. An adult returning to school, Tanya selects a 
paper topic and gets her professor’s approval. After 
working on the paper (3 weeks vs. 4 days), Tanya 
thinks of an alternative topic that is more interesting 
and would take less time to complete.
11. Yvonne asks Dr. Xavier to prescribe a new 
drug for her headaches. Yvonne buys a supply ($450 
for 6 months vs. $90 for 6 weeks), but 1 week before 
finishing the medication decides that it isn’t helping 
and wants to stop.
12. A private in the Army, Leroy plans a way to 
inventory weapons for his commanding officer, Jim. 
After working on it (2 months vs. 2 weeks), Leroy 
figures out a new method that will take less time to 
complete.
APPENDIX
Scenarios in Experiments 1–3
Experiment 1 used Scenarios 1–8. Experiment 2 used Scenarios 1, 3, 6, and 7. Experiment 3 used Scenarios 
5–12. The amount of the initial investment (high vs. low) is in parentheses. Alternate versions of each sce-
nario, including adult-alone versions, were constructed based on the design of each experiment.
